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This paper proposes a new paradigm for the analysis of monetary policy.
From an econometric point of view this new approach is just as easy to imple-
ment as reduced form analysis, but is robust to the Lucas critique. It requires
no explicit prior theory and yet it encompasses all standard DSGE models.
After introducing this new paradigm I study US monetary policy and look at
the nature and the eﬀect of monetary policy, discuss the transmission mechanism
and the policy rule implied by the data, and perform counterfactual policy
analysis.
JEL classiﬁcation: C12,E52
Keywords: DSGE Models, VAR Models, Monetary Policy, Rational Expec-
tations, Lucas Critique, Empirical Time Series Modelling, Applied Macroeco-
nomics
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Non-technical Summary
Ever since the rational expectations revolution transformed theoretical macro-
economics in the late 1970s empirical macroeconomics had to face the following
problem: How can one estimate relationships between macroeconomic variables
such as in￿ ation and growth and at the same time take account for the fact
that both today￿ s spending as well as price decisions depend on the likely future
evolution of the economy, which as of today is not known? In other words, if
economic actions depend on expectations and these expectations are not ob-
servable, how can we incorporate them into empirical models? Further, since
much of empirical macroeconomics focuses on the implications of alternative
economic policies for growth and in￿ ation, how can one incorporate the Lucas
critique, i.e. the notion that expectations about the future and hence today￿ s
actions are functions of the policy regime? And how can we take into account
the fact that future policies might di⁄er from those observed in the past?
This paper proposes a new technique to estimate the e⁄ect of changes in eco-
nomic policy, and monetary policy in particular, on the macroeconomy. What
is novel about this technique is that it estimates a forward-looking representa-
tion from the data and then calculates the implied rational expectations that
correspond to this representation. These techniques are straightforward gen-
eralizations of techniques that are often used in theoretical macroeconomics,
but that have not been applied in the empirical macroeconomics literature until
now.
The paradigm of this paper de￿nes a conditional model for the macroecon-
omy as a (forward-looking) function of super-exogenous1 policy. It then adds
a ￿ marginal￿model for policy. As a ￿rst application we estimate both compo-
nents from past data. We then calculate the rational expectations solution for
this economy and analyze the e⁄ects of an unexpected monetary policy easing.
Further, since policy is super-exogenous, we can also calculate the responses to
any given hypothetical alternative policy rule given the rational expectations
solution that corresponds to this particular alternative policy.
The primary contribution of this paper lies in presenting a novel approach
for empirical macroeconomics. It is shown how we can combine the insights
of the Lucas critique with rational expectations solution techniques to analyze
the e⁄ects of policy shocks for the alternative cases of either estimated or coun-
terfactual policy rules. As a side-e⁄ect we obtain an identi￿cation technique
that solves a problem familiar from the VAR literature on shock identi￿cation.
Finally we relate the techniques to optimal policy and asset pricing.
1The concept of super-exogeneity is reviewed in detail in the paper.1 Introduction
While the question of the e⁄ect of monetary policy on the macroeconomy is
probably the most studied single question in macroeconomics, the answers to
this question still widely diverge, depending on the modeling paradigm used
in the analysis. This paper argues that the two standard paradigms - struc-
tural and reduced form analysis - are intrinsically ill-suited for empirical policy
analysis. We propose a hybrid approach that avoids some of the di¢ culties of
both.
The ￿rst approach is structural modeling in the RBC/DSGE tradition. This
approach focuses on modeling the macroeconomy from microeconomic ￿rst prin-
ciples. The problem here is that the assumptions about the structure of the
economy that have to be made to render this approach feasible, are heroic - at
best. Absent general agreement as to how relevant the ￿rst principles of neo-
classical microeconomics are for a world characterized by incomplete markets,
asymmetric information and heterogeneous agents, one may ask what infor-
mative value micro-structural models have for empirical macroeconomics. The
most mechanical alternative is to throw all prior theory overboard and to fo-
cus on simple regression-based correlations between key variables. This is done
in the VAR literature. Unfortunately, reduced-form models, such as VARs are
subject to the Lucas critique and their usefulness for policy analysis is limited.1
This paper proposes a novel approach: to do data-driven general equilibrium
policy analysis that is robust to the Lucas critique, not model-based, and consis-
tently estimates a reduced-form representation of a dynamic, forward-looking,
stochastic general equilibrium economy under the simple assumption that the
data is generated by a model of this class and that the equilibrium is stable.
The model is trivial to estimate from an econometric point of view, in that it
is based on 2 sets of regressions that can be run by instrumental variable tech-
niques. While the details of this new ￿ semi-structural￿paradigm are outlaid in
detail in section 3 I can sum up its main features in that I can analyze the e⁄ect
of monetary policy by putting together two elements:
1. A conditional macroeconomic model, i.e. a law of motion for the state of
the economy given a policy rule, and
2. A monetary policy rule, i.e. an equation that relates the monetary author-
ity￿ s control variable, the federal funds rate, to the state of the economy
Under the assumptions, standard in DSGE analysis, that the policy rule
is taken as given by all private agents, the resulting model is robust to the
Lucas critique as well as to the generic criticism of imposing ￿ ad hoc￿economic
structure and can be used for empirical and counterfactual policy analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y looks at
the two competing paradigms of the macroeconomic literature - structural and
1The obvious exception here is when the economy is backward-looking as is the case in the
traditional Keynesian models of the Cowles Commission.
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semi-structural model paradigm. Section 3 lays out the complete model for the
macroeconomy and shows how to map very basic low-level structural assump-
tions into a full model for the economy. Section 4 reports empirical results for
the US economy. Section 5 discusses how this new paradigm can be related
to a number of other issues in monetary and ￿nancial economics. Section 6
concludes.
2 Empirical Macroeconomics - How much struc-
ture do we need?
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) start by formulating
control problems for all the agents in the economy: consumers, producers, the
government,... . These control problems take the form of maximizing some
objective function subject to exogenous laws of motion for the state variables
and given informational, technological and behavioral constraints. The resulting
control choices, along with the laws of motion for the states are then aggregated
to economic variables that map into the theoretical analogs of empirically ob-
servable variables. Forward-looking nonlinear structural models can be solved
by focusing on the ￿rst-order necessary conditions, linearizing around the steady
state and applying system-reduction techniques to obtain a backward-looking
reduced form.2 Denote the vector of observables by Yt, the vector of (aug-
mented) states by Xt and the vector of structural shocks by ut. The resulting
system can then be written in reduced-form as a state-space system as
state:
Xt = A(￿)Xt￿1 + B(￿)ut (1)
observation:
Yt = C(￿)Xt (2)
where ￿ is a vector of structural parameters of economic meaning and A(￿),
B(￿) and C(￿) etc. nonlinearly map the structural parameters, ￿, into reduced-
form parameters. The system (1)-(2) can then be used to estimate the vector ￿:
Note that unrestricted estimation of the same system would violate the cross-
equational restrictions imposed by theory.3
The problem with such models is that while they provide an interesting
benchmark they are almost certainly misspeci￿ed along a number of important
dimensions. They usually rely on the existence of an aggregate production func-
tion, a representative consumer, incredible cognitive and computational abilities
on the part of all agents, dubious ways of introducing money, etc.. In partic-
ular, one standard critique of structural models is that they show monetary
shocks to not have noteworthy real e⁄ects unless strong forms of price and/or
2See McGrattan (1994) and McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1996) for examples of log-
linearized models. For linear-quadratic models see the book by Hansen and Sargent (1997)
3See Geweke (1999), Schorfheide (2001) and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio (2001) for
Bayesian approaches to estimating potentially misspeci￿ed structural models.
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and McGrattan (1998, 2000)). This observation has resulted in two contrasting
conclusions. Proponents of structural models stress the ￿nding that there does
not seem to be any (standard) structural model that is capable of producing
important e⁄ects of money on output to indicate that money does not have such
an e⁄ect. This point of view is based on the a priori that, in principle, there is
some structural, micro-founded model that can capture the essential features of
the real world economy. It is then merely a question of perturbing existing mod-
els in new dimensions such as heterogeneity (Krusell and Smith, 1998), habit
formation (Fuhrer (2000), Ljunqvist and Uhlig (2000), Boldrin, Christiano and
Fisher (2001)), etc. in order to eventually converge to an ideal model.4
The alternative point of view suggests that the number of dimensions along
which the current generation of DSGE models is misspeci￿ed is simply too
large to make structural analysis a fruitful way for reading the data. Instead,
simple reduced-form models are used as representations of the data. In his
seminal paper ￿ Macroeconomics and Reality￿Chris Sims (1980) proposed to
simply project the vector of variables of interest on lagged values of itself. Such
vector autoregressions (VARs) are by now the most standard way of looking
at empirical phenomena in all ￿elds of macroeconomics and have proven to be
useful for forecasting as well (Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1983)). From the
perspective of policy analysis the crucial de￿ciency of this paradigm lies in the
Lucas critique.
Lucas (1976) building on Muth (1960, 1961) showed how the reduced-form
solutions of forward-looking rational expectation models are functions of the law
of motion of the exogenous driving process. For the analysis of monetary policy
this means that for any given policy rule the dynamics of the economy, and
hence the transmission mechanism, will be di⁄erent. In terms of the notation
of (1)-(2) this means that the reduced-form matrices A, B, and C are functions
of the policy rule. Since a structural model has the matrices A, B, and C
determined as explicit functions of the structural parameters, ￿, which include
the parameters of the policy rule, we can explicitly recalculate these matrices
for alternative policy rules. Structural models in this sense are therefore robust
to the Lucas critique. Reduced form models on the other hand estimate the
analogs of matrices A, B, and C from a given sample with an associated policy
regime. If this regime were to change these matrices would a priori change as
well, thus exposing reduced form analysis to the Lucas critique.
Relative to these two approaches this paper proposes a hybrid approach.
Within the paradigm of structural dynamic general equilibrium we limit our-
selves to the basic pillars: expectations are rational, policy is exogenous, and
there exists a stable rational expectations equilibrium. As to the exact struc-
ture of the economy, i.e. preference patterns, production technologies, etc., we
remain agnostic and, instead, take our modeling framework directly to the data.
The semi-structural model of this paper is then a parsimonious time-series rep-
4This implicitly assumes that all models are nested. In order to compare non-nested sets of
models one could follow the Bayesian approach laid out in Schorfheide (2001) or Fernandez-
Villaverde and Rubio (2001).
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the data is generated by an economy with rational agents that take policy as
exogenous and that has a stable equilibrium, then we can estimate the data-
generating process and subsequently perform counterfactual policy analysis -
despite having imposed no explicit prior theory (!). To be speci￿c, the class of
models I consider includes all models that are linear with a dimensionality of
observable variables at least equal to the number of structural shocks a⁄ecting
the economy.
I start by assuming that there exists some structural (factor) model that
generates the economy. This means that a given economic environment (set of
endowments, information sets, technical and behavioral structure...) gives rise
to a set of relationships mapping the respective relevant state variables into the










t denote the control and state vector for agents j, respectively
and ￿ is the vector of structural parameters. Since the sets of controls and states
are not mutually exclusive at the aggregate level, let me denote all variables of
economic meaning by an augmented vector Xt: Policy variables are captured by
a vector Pt that is super-exogenous (in the sense of Engle, Hendry and Richards,
1983, see below).
Aggregating and imposing market clearing conditions then leads to a system
of equations describing the dynamics of the economy
Xt = A1(￿)E[Xt+1] + A2(￿)Xt￿1 (3)
+A1P(￿)E[Pt+1] + A2P(￿)Pt + A3P(￿)Pt￿1 + B(￿)ut
The notation in (4) explicitly shows how today￿ s actions are functions of
expected future actions, past actions, and current, past, and expected future
policy. Augmenting vectors Xt and Pt I can rewrite the law of motion for the
economy more compactly as
￿1E[Xt] = ￿0Xt￿1 + ￿P(L)E[Pt] + ￿ut; (4)
where ￿0;￿1;￿P; and ￿ are matrices who￿ s elements are nonlinear functions
of the (unknown) structure of the economy. Given that this structure is here
considered unknown, I will here oppress the dependence on ￿. (4) is a system
of equations that I can estimate (!).
Let me denote the econometric model by hatted matrices
c ￿1E[Xt] = c ￿0Xt￿1 + d ￿P(L)E[Pt] + b ￿ut; (5)
I call (5) a conditional model for the macroeconomy given a super-exogenous
policy rule. If I then merely add any arbitrary - estimated or calibrated - policy
ECB • Working Paper No 257 • September 2003 9rule I can then solve the combined general equilibrium system for a reduced-form





= Yt = ￿Yt￿1 + B￿ut (6)
What this means is that if the underlying data generating process is of the
assumed linear form, then I can then consistently estimate the impact of the
super-exogenous subvector Pt on the entire economy without having to make any
assumptions about the economic structure of the economy under the maintained
hypothesis that the equations determining the super-exogenous subvector Pt
are correctly speci￿ed. For consistency all lag- and lead-orders are chosen by
Schwarz￿ s Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
What distinguishes the semi-structural model of this paper from the fully
structural models of the literature is that fully structural models require a com-
plete speci￿cation of the structure of the economy, whereas the semi-structural
model merely requires speci￿cation of the policy rule. If all other agents of
the economy take the policy rule as given, then this semi-structural approach
is equivalent to data-driven general equilibrium modeling and as far as policy
analysis is concerned the Lucas critique does not apply.
To see this key point recall we can always write the density of the Markov
process Xt = [Yt;Pt] as f(XtjXt￿1;￿) = f(YtjPt;Xt￿1;￿2)f(PtjXt￿1;￿1). Weak
exogeneity of Pt with respect to a parameter vector of interest ￿ = g(￿2) then
implies that ￿1 and ￿2 must be variation free, i.e. ￿1 and ￿2 should not be
subject to any restrictions. This implies that the marginal model for Pt is not
informative on g(￿2). If in addition ￿2 is invariant to the set of possible varia-
tions in ￿1 that is de￿ned by ￿
g
1;i = fhi : ￿1;i = h(￿i;g);8ig, then Pt is termed
super-exogenous with respect to g(￿2): In the current context Pt denotes policy,
Yt the remainder of the economy￿ s variables, and ￿2 parameterizes the econ-
omy￿ s law of motion, i.e. ￿2 = f￿1;￿0;￿P(:)g. Super-exogeneity of policy then
means that I can write the general equilibrium law of motion as a conditional
model for the economy - ￿ f(YtjPt;Xt￿1;￿2)￿ - given some marginal model for
policy- ￿ f(PtjXt￿1;￿1)￿ -, and that the parameter vector ￿2 that parameterizes
the (forward-looking) model dynamics is independent of changes of the mar-
ginal model, i.e. the policy rule, ￿1: All the Lucas critique says is that the
general equilibrium reduced-form coe¢ cients ￿
￿ = f￿;B￿g are functions of the
parameters that describe the density of the driving process, here policy, i.e. ￿1.
Clearly, the solution of the general equilibrium-model de￿ned by the mapping
f￿1;￿2g 7￿! ￿
￿ depends on the policy rule, ￿1. Since the present paradigm
explicitly considers the forward-looking behavior of the agents through the ma-
trices ￿1, ￿0; and the matrix polynomial ￿P(:) it is not only that the present
model is robust to the Lucas critique6, but it constructively applies its tenants
at a practical level. Thus, it is possible to do counterfactual policy analysis just
5The techniques laid out in the appendix directly follow from Sims (2002).
6The present modeling approach is robust to the Lucas critique under the assumptions that
the data-generating process is linear and that policy is super-exogenous. The Lucas critique
in a more general sense applies to the present model for it may be argued that there have
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that any DSGE model is an element of the class of models here considered by
means of a simple but representative model example.
The empirical model of this paper, which will be described in detail in
the next section, models the economy as a reduced form model with a super-
exogenous process for monetary policy. Monetary policy then is modeled with
an estimated forward-looking policy rule.
2.1 Empirical Evidence on the Macroeconomic E⁄ects of
Money
The body of empirical literature that looks at the e⁄ect of monetary policy
on the macroeconomy is impressive. (See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1999), CEE) for an excellent literature review). The main ￿ndings can be
summed up as follows.
While monetary shocks are correlated with important movements in real
variables, the bulk of the variability is due to systematic policy, i.e. to reactions
to other variables/structural shocks in the same period. The potential e⁄ects
of monetary shocks being measured by orthogonalized impulse responses show
that a monetary innovation leads to a hump shaped and drawn out response in
output. While this e⁄ect could be of quantitative importance, some assert that
the historic variance of policy shocks has been so low during the past decades
that the variance share of real variables due to monetary policy shocks in the
sample is small at all but the very short horizon. This last argument depends
crucially on the exact speci￿cation of the VAR. In fact, while the short-run e⁄ect
is fairly robust across speci￿cations, the path from the hump-shaped maximum
e⁄ect to the long-term e⁄ect varies greatly across speci￿cations.
Many other interesting questions about empirical monetary macroeconomics
arise. The problem with these questions is that they cannot be easily mapped
into both frameworks and sometimes neither one of the two. How shall one
disentangle the transmission mechanism from the policy rule in a reduced-form
model? What is the value to a policy maker to know optimal monetary policy
in a calibrated and stylized model if he knows that the model is wrong8? In
been regime changes during the sample period, which would bias the entire model. Such a
disclaimer, in fact, applies to all models, theoretical or empirical, for any structural model
might just as well ignore some structural change in the economy such as a policy regime
change. As always, the model here is consistently estimated under the Null that it is correctly
speci￿ed, which here means in particular that there is no policy regime change during the
sample period.
7On the other hand, since reduced form analysis ignores the presence of the polynomial
￿P(:) it can only be useful for policy analysis if ￿P(:) is not present in the data-generating
process, i.e. if the entire economy is backward-looking
8Recall that the RBC school objects to estimation in favor of calibration because the model
is known to be wrong. Here I go one step further. I build on the methodological paradigm of
the RBC school as far as the assumption of a unique and stable rational expectations equi-
librium goes. But as far as policy analysis is concerned I can then drop the entire theoretical
underpinning - which is known to be wrong to start with - and instead estimate a simple
forward looking equations for the macroeconomic variables of interest directly from the data.
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only as far as the usual impulse-response analysis and variance decomposition
accounting. On the other hand, the new paradigm of this paper allows analysis
of a variety of additional questions. Thus, we can not only compare its implica-
tions to those of the two alternative modeling approaches, but can show where
the other approaches go wrong. This is because both the reduced form as well as
the fully structural approach are restricted subcases of the new ￿ semi-structural￿
paradigm.9
The new paradigm of this paper allows full empirical and counter-factual
policy analysis in a simple estimated model. For example, one can disentangle
the nature of the policy rule from the monetary transmission mechanism. Also,
we can estimate policy rules for di⁄erent time periods and compare the mone-
tary transmission mechanism through time by looking at the response function
of output to monetary innovations to the estimated as well as hypothetical pol-
icy rules. This distinction is important in the cross-sectional comparison of
monetary policy rules, for example. Asymptotically free of the restrictions of a
potentially misspeci￿ed economic structure due to its estimated form, and ro-
bust to the Lucas critique under the maintained assumption of super-exogeneity
of the estimated policy rule, the present model is subjected to a number of policy
exercises in Section 4, where the relevant literature is discussed.
2.2 Monetary Policy Rules
The literature on monetary policy rules is enormous10 and I will limit myself
to some recent papers that try to combine a conditional macroeconomic model
and a policy rule in a vain similar to the one of this paper.
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000, CGG) is probably the most quoted piece
of recent work in this ￿eld. CGG estimate Taylor-type policy rules for the US,
allowing for smoothing, and discuss the issues of structural breaks (pre-Volker
vs. Volker-Greenspan) as well as the relevance of sunspots in the context of a
simple sticky price model for the macroeconomy. I will get back to both issues
below.
Boivin and Giannoni (2001) estimate VARs for di⁄erent time periods and
calibrate a ￿ structural￿model - with backward-looking price setters and habit
formation - to the impulse-responses of a VAR to perform counterfactual policy
experiments. They fail to realize that strictly speaking there is no need to
calibrate a ￿ structural￿model to do counterfactual policy analysis and that their
doing so unneccesarily limits the practical relevance of their results.
Finally, Soderlind (2001) estimates a simple DSGE model by maximum like-
lihood and then performs counterfactual policy analysis. He asks ￿ What if the
Fed had been an in￿ation Nutter?￿ and compares the time path of macroeco-
9This is certainly true for the conditional macroeconomic model, i.e. for the model of the
macroeconomy given a policy rule. If the policy rule is correctly speci￿ed then this naturally
applies to the complete general-equilibrium model.
10For a comprehensive overview over this huge literature, see the homepage on monetary
policy rules by John Taylor at http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/PolRulLink.htm
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teract in￿ ation. Again, the author fails to realize that no structural model is
necessary and that the imposition of one conditions his results on a particular
economy that may or may not be a good empirical model.
Relative to the literature this paper proposes an empirical model for the
study of monetary policy that has two characterizing new features.
First, it proposes to model the macroeconomy not with a stylized structural
model, but with an estimated forward-looking linear model.
Second, money, or more precisely, the federal funds rate, is modeled with
a structural equation. Rather than simply regressing the federal funds rate on
a vector of observable variables as is done in the pure reduced form approach,
the federal funds rate is here modeled directly with a forward-looking policy
rule, i.e. a functional relationship between the control variable, the federal
funds rate, and expectations of future variables that describe the state of the
economy. Here it will be assumed that the monetary authority determines the
federal funds rate as a function of the path of in￿ ation and output growth
only. The advantage of this explicit policy rule speci￿cation is that it yields
an economically interpretable policy rule rather than reduced form coe¢ cients
devoid of any direct meaning. Estimates of such policy rules where used in
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998a,b, 2000) and Batini and Haldane (1999) among
others, but to the knowledge of the author such a rule has not been used in
combination with an estimated transmission mechanism that would allow the
quantitative analysis of the economic e⁄ects of such a rule. The estimated model
of this paper will allow me to obtain a numerical estimate of the policy reaction
to expected in￿ ation and output growth as well as an estimate of how the central
bank endogenously reacts to macroeconomic shocks via their dynamic e⁄ect on
in￿ ation and growth. The technical details of the model will be presented in
the following section.
3 The Model
The model has two main ingredients, the reduced form model for the macro-
economy and the structural policy rule, each which will be presented now.
3.1 The macroeconomy
The observed economy is denoted by a vector Xt, and is potentially observed
with noise.
(1 ￿ L)Xt = ￿X + Hzt + ￿t; (7)
where E[￿t] = 0;E[￿tzT
t ] = 0
The dynamics of the economy are driven by a vector of mutually orthogonal
factors, Ft; with dynamics that are given the following linear di⁄erence equation
zt = A(L)zt￿1 + C(L)E[Pt] + Bst (8)
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vector of factors, zt, by n and q ￿ n respectively.11 Pt denotes a vector of
exogenously determined variables, here limited to the monetary policy￿ s control
variable, the federal funds rate. Note that since this is a dynamic forward-
looking rational expectations model, both A(L) and C(L) are a lead and lag
polynomial in L.
At this point I would like to consider two sub-classes of models for the econ-
omy that have both been empirically applied in related contexts and which have
di⁄erent advantages in the current setting. First, I could model the factors zt
by principal component analysis (PCA). In this case I can extract zt as the ￿rst
q principal components of the variance matrix of (1 ￿ L)Xt. H is the matrix
obtained from the eigenvectors associated with the ￿rst q eigenvalues and ￿t
is residually de￿ned. The intuition for modeling the economy through a small
number of factors is as follows. Macroeconomic theory at a very broad level
can be cast in terms of a small number of aggregate shocks. In addition, an
unappealing aspect of the shocks recovered from a VAR is that it is hard to
come up with economic classi￿cation and identi￿cation schemes for n shocks
for n larger than 3. By assuming that the structural shock vector is of reduced
dimension, the identi￿cation problem is signi￿cantly reduced. Obviously, this
assumption could be false, but even then, as long as I have correctly identi￿ed
the largest q shocks, the orthogonality of the factors assures that the result-
ing system that describes the monetary transmission mechanism has maximal
explanatory power relative to any other liner system of that order.
Alternatively, I could estimate a model of the type (8), where the factors
are rotations of the observable variables Xt themselves (i.e. q = n). This would
amount essentially to estimating a VAR with Pt as an exogenous regressor.
In the empirical application below I will focus on the case where the macro-
model is written in terms of two observables, output growth, and in￿ ation12.
It is important to stress that since fft is modeled as super-exogenous, the
speci￿cation (8) is the most general time series representation of any economic
system in the following sense. If all variables that a⁄ect the economy where ob-
servable and the data-generating process where a structural economy is de￿ned
in the sense of section 2, then estimation of (8) would recover the true model in
the limit. See appendix 1 for details.
correlated estimates of structural shocks The DSGE literature usu-
ally considers structural shocks to be orthogonal, i.e. one may label an in-
11This means that the spectral frequency matrix is of rank q at all frquencies. At an intuitive
level, this is related to the hypothesis of a reduced rank matrix at frequency zero implicit in
co-integration analysis. Obviously, the hypothesis here is much stronger in that it applies at
all frequencies.
12While I did apply the standard battery of unit root tests to check whether the assumption
of integration of order one, I(1), for the levels of output and growth is justi￿ed - in fact, I
cannot reject the Null of I(1) for both series even at the 10 per cent signi￿cance level - it is
well-known that the power of these tests relative to local alternatives goes to zero, in particular
given the sample size here at hand.
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an innovation to the level of productivity as a productivity shock. Since the
DSGE literature focuses on calibrated models, the issue of uncorrelated struc-
tural shocks is a convenient structural assumption. On the other hand, the
VAR literature estimates linear models and ￿nds the residuals of the various
equations to be highly correlated, which leads to the uncomfortable problem of
identi￿cation of an impact matrix. Usually, one therefore imposes some type of
more-or-less convincing set of restrictions on the impact matrix in order to be
able to discuss the e⁄ects of ￿ structural￿ , shocks that are here again assumed to
be orthogonal, but a⁄ecting more than one variable on impact.13 In the present
context, we have already solved for the simultaneous feedback of the entire
economic system when solving the semi-structural forward-looking form repre-
sentation for its reduced-form analog. As such, it doesn￿ t make a lot of sense
to talk about an implicit Wold ordering or impact matrix restrictions. Instead,
in calculating the impulse-responses to a structural shock to, say, in￿ ation, we
have actually already calculated the simultaneous e⁄ect on all other variables,
on expectations of future policy, and the feedback e⁄ect of all these changes on
the shocked variable itself. Hence, if we ￿nd the estimated variance-covariance
matrix of the shocks to the economy to be non-diagonal, then it is because
structural shocks are, in the data, not uncorrelated. As a result, a simulation
of the theoretical model that assumes an orthogonal shock structure will fail
to generate a theoretical variance-covariance matrix that is equivalent to that
estimated from the data. Yet, for the exercise of policy analysis it is important
to do counterfactual analysis. Counterfactual analysis here then means that I
abstract from the correlation of the estimated structural shocks in the data and
look at the e⁄ects of a hypothetical structural shock to a particular variable ce-
teris paribus, i.e. all other variables unshocked. Since I solve for the endogenous
simultaneous e⁄ect on all other variables a shock to this one particular variable
will in general equilibrium generally a⁄ect other variables simultaneously, but
this e⁄ect is independent of any assumed Wold ordering or statistical exclusion
restrictions.
3.2 The Central Bank
The objective function of the central bank is simple. I here do not assume any
particular parametric form for its objective function, but rather assume that its
choice is given by setting its target interest rate equal to a linear combination
of current, past, and expected future deviations of in￿ ation and output growth
from their targets.
ff￿
t = E[a(L￿1)(￿t ￿ ￿￿) + b(L￿1)(yt ￿ ￿y)jFt] + um
t ; (9)
13The VAR literature in fact confounds two issues: correlation of shocks and instantaneous
e⁄ect. In a VAR setting we could not distinguish between variable A at time t reacting to
the level of variable B at time and a correlation between the shocks to A and B, which could
mean that variable A does not react to variable B at time t. A projection residual would not
allow us to distinguish between the two cases.





The realized federal funds rate is then modeled as a linear combination of
this target rate and past periods￿realized rates, i.e. the central bank smooths
the interest rate path across time.
fft = ￿(L)fft￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿(1))ff￿
t (10)
The reduced form of the resulting joint economic system can then be written
in the following augmented state-space form




































t and ￿t denote macro shocks, the policy shock, and observation
noise respectively and zt and fft are appropriately augmented.
While this is a system that I can estimate by GMM, I cannot use it for
simulation or analysis just yet. The problem is that it is a matrix di⁄erence
equation with nontrivial leads and lags that involves expectations that I ￿rst
have to solve for. In order to do so I have to check the stability and uniqueness
conditions of Blanchard and Kahn (1980). Intuitively, these conditions check if
there is a unique rational expectations equilibrium that can be associated with
the system (11)-(12) (see Sims (2002) or Klein (2000)). If both conditions are
met then I can uniquely project all expectations of future variables on variables
known at time t and obtain a backward-looking representation that I can make
use of for policy analysis.

















The impact matrix B￿ in column j then shows the impact e⁄ect of a struc-
tural shock to variable j, where structural means that this shock shocks only
variable j and no other variable either directly or through correlated shocks.
However, given that the model is forward-looking, a shock to variable j implies
a changed future time path for this variable and all other variables that are
a⁄ected by it. These changes in expectations of the future then a⁄ect all of
today￿ s variables that are forward-looking. As a result, the impact matrix B￿
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i;j only if the respective variable i is backward-
looking. See appendix 2 for details. For convenience we put state the core of
the present paradigm in the form of a proposition
Proposition 1 Suppose the dynamics of an economy can be described by the


















Then one can check whether it is stable and if so associate with it a backward-

















The solution (15) might be unique or not, a condition we can check by looking
at the eigenvalues of the canonical representation associated with (14).
(See Appendix 2 for details.) If the system is stable and unique, then the impact
matrix is B￿ identi￿able. If the system is stable and not unique then it allows
for sunspot dynamics. In the sunspot case usually it is neither the impact e⁄ect,
the size of the shock, nor its dynamic e⁄ect on the system that are identi￿able.
While this paper focuses on the analysis of a semi-structural model for mon-
etary policy the proposition has direct implications for the popular empirical
tool that are vector autoregressions.
Corollary 2 If we assume that all structural shocks are uncorrelated, then we
can apply the same techniques to a (potentially forward-looking) vector autore-
gression
(￿ ￿ ￿B1L￿1 ￿ ￿B2L￿2 ￿ ￿F1L ￿ ￿F2L2)Et [YtjFt] = ut; (16)
where Yt denotes the vector of variables, ￿ a matrix with unit diagonal el-
ements, ut, the vector of shocks, and the information set Ft includes all past
realizations as well as for each equation i all current observations for all vari-
ables j 6= i. This way we can condition on the time t realizations of all other
variables in a given period before analyzing the e⁄ects of an innovation to vari-
able i .
The corollary implies that we can use the present techniques to analyze
standard VARs without making assumptions about the impact matrix as is
usually done (imposing Wold orderings, long-run e⁄ects, zero restrictions, etc.).
There are some similarities worth noting between the present approach and
those proposed by Rigobon (2003) and Beyer and Farmer (2003). All three ap-
proaches attempt to get around the usual identi￿cation problem of the impact
matrix in multivariate systems by exploiting particular knowledge about the
system under study. In the case of Rigobn and Beyer and Farmer (2003) this is
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reestimating the same equation for di⁄erent sample periods. If the identi￿ed
parameters are stable the di⁄erent estimated variance-covariance matrices for
the di⁄erent samples then allow identi￿cation of the otherwise unidenti￿ed pa-
rameters (of the impact matrix). In these papers the method of estimation is
ML/OLS, whereas in the present paper we move to GMM/IV. Our method of
estimation allows us to apply our techniques also to setting where the under-
lying process is of homoscedastic through time. On the other hand we slightly
loose e¢ ciency, which is a bigger problem in applications where the data has low
autocorrelation and when there are no alternative good instruments available.
Which of these alternative estimation techniques for otherwise unidenti￿able
parameters is more e¢ cient or robust is clearly dependent on the application at
hand.
The following section will present empirical results for postwar US time
series.
4 Empirical Results
This section reports the estimation results of the model outlined in the pre-
vious section for an application to quarterly U.S. data (the sample is 1984:01
to 2000:04).14 The lag and lead orders of the macroeconomic factor model as
well as the policy rule were chosen by Schwarz￿ s Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC). Since all lead and lag orders are chosen simultaneously I have to evaluate
a total number of models that is given by the product of the all the possible lead
and lag orders I consider for the various polynomials. Speci￿cally, I consider
lags and leads in the policy rule from 1 to 8 and a smoothing polynomial of
lag order 0 to 8. Likewise, for the conditional model I consider leads and lags
in macro factors up to 8 periods, and leads and lags in the short rate of up
to 8 periods. I also allow for contemporaneous feedback in both directions.15
All estimates are based on exactly-identi￿ed linear IV estimation using lagged
observables, the robust variance-covariance estimates are constructed following
Newey and West (1987).
4.1 The macroeconomic model
For the conditional model of the macroeconomy or, for purposes of the dis-
cussion of monetary policy, the transmission mechanism, the BIC chooses the
minimal orders of zero lead and zero lags for the polynomial associated with
14All data are from FRED, the economic web database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. The federal funds rateseries refers to the quarterly averages obtained from monthly
data (source: H.15 release of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors) . The output growth
series refers to changes in logs of total seasonally adjusted real output in chained 1996 Dollars
(source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis). The in￿ation rate
refers to the consumer price index for all urban consumers: all items, seasonally adjusted
(source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics)
15I thus estimate and compare a total of 419904 model speci￿cations.
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4.2 The monetary policy rule
The policy rule has a minimum lead order of 0, i.e. only contemporaneous macro
variables enter, and no lags. A marginal e⁄ect of the contemporaneous state of
the economy given expectations about the future as well as a marginal e⁄ect of
the past is decided against based on the BIC. The smoothing polynomial is of
order 2. The estimated policy rule looks as follows (t-statistics in parentheses)







(￿yt ￿ ￿y) + 2:42
(2:15)
(￿t ￿ ￿￿) + em
t
Three comments are in order. First, the response to deviations from the
(assumed constant) target level of in￿ ation is strong. To those familiar with
the literature on determinacy in calibrated sticky price models (see Kerr and
King (1996), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998a), or Woodford (2002)), this may
be comforting. In standard calibrated models, the policy rule generally has
to react with a coe¢ cient of at least unity to deviations in future in￿ ation
in order to assure determinacy of the equilibrium dynamics. Otherwise, the
model￿ s dynamics are indeterminate in the sense that nonfundamental shocks
to expectations - so-called sunspot shocks - can generate self-ful￿lling dynamics
that qualify as dynamic rational expectations equilibria. As will be shown below,
the standard determinacy frontier is very much model-dependent, however, and
the present model would actually still be determinate even if we calibrated this
response to be nil.
Secondly, the importance of the smoothing polynomial, which has been
shown in other studies (see, for example, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998a,
2000)), seems noteworthy. In e⁄ect, the almost unit root behavior means that
it is not so much the interest rate that reacts to changes in expectations about
future policy, but more the change in the interest rate. It is oftentimes argued
that smoothing is a policy means to promote ￿nancial stability (see Estrella
(2001) for a literature review). Intuitively, the argument goes, higher variability
in the short rate will lead, ceteris paribus, to higher long-term yields. Since the
ECB • Working Paper No 257 • September 2003 19short-rate is clearly only an intermediary tool in in￿ uencing medium- and long-
term yields which are more important for investment decisions on the income
side and real estate and equity wealth on the wealth side, lower interest rate
variability at the short end of the yield curve has direct implications for long-
term yields, and thus the level of wealth and production of an economy, and may
for this reason be desirable. This is clearly a fallacy of decomposition, for due
to Jensen￿ s inequality term, higher short-term interest rate variability actually
lowers longer term interest rates in a model where the local expectations hy-
pothesis holds. As a result, the apparent presence of the smoothing character of
empirical policy might not be welfare-improving at all. On the other hand Sack
and Wieland (2000) present theoretical considerations for why smoothing might
be optimal for reasons such as measurement errors in target variables or model
uncertainty. In any event, we do retain the smoothing speci￿cation because it
clearly improves the statistical ￿t of the model and allows better comparison
with other studies.
Finally, the interest rate response with respect to expected future growth is
negative. Here it is important to note that this is the marginal e⁄ect of expected
future growth, i.e. the e⁄ect of expected growth given expected future in￿ ation
expectations. Since a shock to growth that does not move in￿ ation expectations
does not put the monetary authority￿ s goal of in￿ ation stability at risk, this does
not seem surprising. On the other hand, the conditional correlation between
growth and in￿ ation is positive. Also note that the interest rate reaction with
respect to in￿ ation relative to the reaction to growth is stronger than the ratio
of the relative multipliers requires. Consequently, an expansion caused by a
monetary ease will be stabilized through future rises in interest rates and the
model is dynamically stable.
4.3 Dynamic E⁄ects of Monetary and Macroeconomic Shocks
Figures (1)-(3) shows the impulse responses of output growth and in￿ ation along
with bootstrapped 95% con￿dence bands16 to a one-time one percent deviation
from the policy rule for the system (17)-(18).
Note that since the monetary shock is de￿ned relative to a policy rule, there
is an automatic feedback e⁄ect to the degree that the monetary shock moves
the entire future path of growth and in￿ ation to which current policy in turn
reacts. Hence, the e⁄ect of a policy-induced boom in output and the associated
rise in in￿ ation leads to an automatic stabilization of realized interest rates.
This e⁄ect is fairly weak, however, and a one percent shock to the policy rule
16The error bands are obtained from the following simple bootstrap procedure. Given the
empirical distribution of the system￿ s shock vector fusgs￿T I draw N = 500 time series of
length T from this empirical distribution (with replacement), which I denote as fb ui
sgs￿T for
i = 1;:::;N. I then generate N arti￿cial samples fb Y i
sgs￿T by feeding the system the shock
series fb ui
sgs￿T and reestimate my model from each arti￿cial sample. Finally I compute my
statistics of interest g(b Y i
s) and calculate the cut-o⁄ g ￿
2 (b Y i
s) and g1￿ ￿
2 (b Y i
s) values that de￿ne
a con￿dence interval with coverage of (1￿￿)%. My point estimate will be the bootstrap-bias-
corrected mean g =
PN
i=1 g(b Y i
s).
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points.
Let me make four comments about this impulse-response. First, the re-
sponse of output growth is stronger than that of in￿ ation, a result that may
be surprising to those who think in monetarist terms, but a result that is often
encountered in other empirical estimates of the e⁄ect of monetary shocks (see,
for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999)).
Second, the presence of the estimated smoothing behavior in a forward-
looking model of rational expectations determines the reaction of the macro-
economy to a policy shock. Consequently, the reaction is delayed and hump-
shaped, maximal only more than two years after the impact of the shock, and
generally following the pattern of interest rates closely with a lag of 7 and 8
quarters year and multipliers of -1.2 and -0.6 for output growth and in￿ ation,
respectively. Figure (4) plots the conditional expectations of in￿ ation and out-
put growth divided by their respective multipliers at time t+s+7(8) along with
the conditional expectations of the interest rates at time t + s conditional on a
monetary shock at time t.
Third, the above speci￿cation is extremely parsimonious. Since it is well-
known that the BIC tends to choose rather underparameterized models in ￿nite
samples I have repeated the order selection procedure with Akaike￿ s information
criterion (AIC). The AIC-speci￿cation chooses a lag order in macro variables of 2
for the macroeconomic model and a smoothing polynomial of order 3. All of the
results reported below are very much the same for this alternative speci￿cation.
Finally, note that the above responses are all with respect to a 1 percent
shock to the policy rule, i.e. a deviation of realized interest rates from their
expected value by 100 basis points. Naturally this is just a convenient normal-
ization.
Overall we observe a clear qualitative ￿nding: both output growth and in-
￿ ation rise temporarily after an interest rate shock. The response seems to be
hump-shaped with a maximal e⁄ect after approximately two years.
5 Policy Analysis
5.1 Comparing Historical Policy Rules
The key insight in rational expectations macroeconomics (Muth (1960, 1961),
Lucas (1976)) is that the optimal decision rules in dynamic and stochastic con-
trol problems, such as consumption or investment demand, are function of the
moments of the law of motion of the states that a⁄ect the control problem. For
our analysis this means that any change in the policy rule could potentially cause
a change in the law of motion of the economy, thus rendering exercises of com-
parative dynamics useless. However, as shown in section 2, the present model
has the forward-looking nature of economic actions incorporated, thus rendering
it immune to the Lucas critique as far as policy experiments are concerned. Cer-
tainly, the reduced form of the model changes as a function of monetary policy,
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can manipulate the policy rule and perform counterfactual experiments with
this estimated model.
As an example, I have done an exercise analog to the one presented in
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998b, CGG). CGG compare the implications of
di⁄erent estimated policy rules, notably those estimated for the pre Volker vs.
the Volker-Greenspan era. What distinguishes the present exercise from the
one performed in CGG is that CGG enter their estimated policy rule in a small-
scale sticky-price model, whereas I use the estimated policy rule in combination
with the transmission mechanism, the conditional model of the macroeconomy,
estimated from post-1984 data. I am thus looking at what would have happened
if the Federal Reserve System had continued to use the same policy rule it had
used from 1964 to 1982.
The primary di⁄erence is the smaller reaction of the interest rate to expected
future growth and in￿ ation. The estimated rule is as follows










The policy rule has exactly the same orders as the one estimated for the
Volker-Greenspan era. Note the clear lack of signi￿cance of the forward-looking
terms in the policy rule. According to (19) policy in the period 1964-1982 could
then be described as largely passive. Still the e⁄ect of interest rate shocks on
the macroeconomy is largely the same because of the strong direct e⁄ects on
the macroeconomy that are not o⁄set through countercyclical policy. Figure (5)
plots the impulse responses. Also note that while the response to a normalized
interest rate shock of 100 basis points is actually smaller with the pre-1982 rule
than with respect to the post-1984 rule, the standard deviation in the former
case is much larger in the earlier period (120 (!) basis points) than in the latter
(35 basis points).
5.2 Sunspots and Indeterminacy in Linear Rational Ex-
pectation Models
In section 3 the forward-looking semi-structural model had to be solved for a
unique rational expectations solution by projecting all variables of future time
periods on the current information set in a way that stability of the system
was assured. While stability requires a certain root condition to hold, it does
not generally reduce the set of stable solutions to a singleton. An additional
root condition can be checked to see if uniqueness holds - and it does in the
case of the point estimates of this paper￿ s model -, but it is straightforward
to calibrate - or, for that matter, estimate - models that fail the uniqueness
condition. In this case there exists an r-dimensional space of so-called ￿ sunspot￿
equilibria, where r denotes the number of excess stable roots. (see Sims (2002),
Klein (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2001), and appendix 2 for details)
Kerr and King (1996) were probably the ￿rst to note that simple policy rules
a la Taylor can result in indeterminacy in calibrated sticky-price models. As
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ple Taylor-type policy rule and plug it into a calibrated model. At their point
estimates for U.S. data covering the pre-Volker era, they ￿nd indeterminacy
to be a problem and argue that passiveness of monetary policy could gener-
ically be an empirically relevant cause for nonuniqueness. Woodford (2002)
presents a textbook treatment of standard sticky-price models and discusses
limits on policy rules that assure determinacy. In these standard sticky-price
model uniqueness is usually guaranteed if interest rates respond to in￿ ation by a
more-than-proportional increase in nominal interest rates, i.e. real rates have to
rise. As the estimates of this paper show (see (19)), this result is a by-product
of the calibrated transmission mechanism of in￿ ation and interest rates in these
models.
To the knowledge of the author the only published econometric study of de-
terminacy in linear rational expectations models seems to be Farmer and Guo
(1995, FG). FG estimate an RBC model from postwar US data and ￿nd evi-
dence for indeterminacy.17 On the other hand, the point estimates of this paper
suggest for the period under study U.S. data does not seem to be characterized
by indeterminacy in the sense that models with indeterminacy simply imply
higher BIC values. Such representations are usually very far forward-looking
and imply extremely erratic impulse responses. As such it appears that they
are mere artifacts of over￿tting the data. Intuitively, the relative unimportance
of monetary policy for the question of indeterminacy is due to its small e⁄ect on
the macroeconomy. While in calibrated sticky price models monetary variability
is the key factor driving macroeconomic variables, the present estimated model
shows that at least for the sample period and for the U.S. monetary variability
seems to a minor factor and given the inherent stability of the economic system
(unknown to us for we have only estimated a reduced form representation of the
data), monetary policy does not seem to induce macroeconomic indeterminacy.
5.3 Optimal Policy
To many, the quest for optimal policy is the raison d￿ Œtre of monetary economics
and the literature of how to de￿ne, qualify, and conduct optimal policy is enor-
mous and still rapidly evolving. At the same time, two basic assumptions drive
most of the results. The ￿rst assumption is about how to
model the central bank￿ s loss function. The second is about how to model
the central bank￿ s policy rule.
As to the central bank￿ s loss function, many studies in the general equilib-
rium literature use the utility function of a presumed representative agent (see
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)). Alternatively, the o¢ cial mandate of central
17The relative lack of impact of this study on the profession may be in part due to the
brilliant discussion by Rao Aiyagari (1995), who analytically shows why indeterminacy is
unlikely to be a credible factor in standard RBC models. Yet, Aiyagari￿ s arguments are
very model-speci￿c and, as he notes, do in no way limit the relevance of asking whether
indeterminacy could be an issue in other models and, more to the point, whether indeterminacy
could be a real-world phenomenon.
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other weighing of in￿ ation and output variability with weighs determined by
the political mandate speci￿c to the central bank of the economy under study.
Given on objective function optimal policy is then straightforward to calculate
both for the discretion as well as for the commitment case given that we are
equipped with a Lucas-robust estimate of the transmission mechanism. For
computational details, see Soderlind (1999), for example.
5.4 Asset-Pricing Implications
Appendix 3 shows how the present model also is a general equilibrium asset
pricing model. In fact, following the DSGE motivation, if the observed data
is generated by a unique and stable rational-expectations equilibrium, then the
present model can be augmented to consistently estimate the pricing kernel of
the economy as long as the later is a¢ ne without any necessity to specify a utility
function. Intuitively, the pricing kernel has to be measurable with respect to
the relevant ￿ltration. But in the Markov case the relevant ￿ltration is given
by current period state variables. Thus, making an assumption about a ￿ exible
functional form for the pricing kernel renders calculation of the interest rate
term structure a straightforward exercise. For details, see appendix 3.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a data-driven alternative to structural DSGE analysis. The
proposed ￿ semi-structural￿model is an econometric model that nests all standard
structural DSGE models as special subcases.
Summing up, the present state of the literature on macroeconomic general
equilibrium modeling o⁄ers two alternative routes: Either one makes very re-
strictive - ad hoc (?) - assumptions about the (unobservable) structure of the
economy or one models the economy in reduced form and tries to give some
structural interpretation to the reduced-form representation. Given the Lucas
critique as well as the (structural) VAR critiques of Canova and Pina (2000),
Sartre (1987), Rudebusch (1999), or Klae› ing (2003) it is not clear how useful
this approach is for empirical policy analysis. In addition, certain questions
cannot be asked in a reduced-form setting. The policy rule of the monetary
policy maker and the monetary transmission mechanism, for example, are con-
voluted and cannot be studied separated. Relative to these two alternatives,
the approach of this paper instead focuses on the pure logical implications of
the structural general equilibrium paradigm: agents are forward-looking, ad-
justment lags are ￿nite, policy is exogenous, and the equilibrium is stable.
Building on these basic pillars I propose a time-series approach to macroeco-
nomic general equilibrium modeling. It combines an estimated, forward-looking,
structural equation for a policy variable with an estimated, forward-looking,
reduced-form system for a vector of key economic variables to obtain the em-
pirically estimated analog to a DSGE model solution.
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of the modeled policy variable on the economy including: impulse-response
analysis, comparative and separate study of the policy rule and the transmission
mechanism across time, the stabilizing or destabilizing role of monetary policy,
optimal policy, and the e⁄ect of policy shocks on the term structure of interest
rates.
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A.1 Solving a dynamic forward-looking general equilib-
rium model for a backward-looking reduced form
The following algorithm is a conceptually straightforward application of the
techniques of Klein (2000), and, in particular, Sims (2002).18
I start with an economic system that is comprised of two building blocks:
a conditional model for the macroeconomy, (20), given super-exogenous policy
rule and a marginal model for policy, (21), that closes the system.
Xt = A(L)Xt￿1 + C(L)E[Pt] + Bumacro
t (20)
Pt = D(L)Pt￿1 + F(L)E[Xt] + u
p
t; (21)
where A(L), C(L) and F(L) are forward- and backward-looking polynomials,
D(L) is backward-looking.
More compactly, I can rewrite the general equilibrium representation as (22)








5 is a stacked vector of economic variables and expecta-
tions respectively, ut denotes the vector of i.i.d. (w.l.o.g.) structural economic
shocks and &t denotes endogenous expectational errors. The subvector Et is
obtained by stacking expectations. For example e
ij
t denotes the time t expec-
tation of variable j for period t+i, i.e. e
ij
t = E[wj;t+i]; where wj is the position






Following Sims (2002) I will solve for an equilibrium law of motion of Yt in
autoregressive form
Yt = ￿Yt￿1 + B￿ut (23)
The algorithm is presented in 5 steps.
￿ Step 1: Apply the QZ transform to the matrix pencil in (22) and rewrite
as
QTSZTYt = QTTZTYt￿1 + ￿ut + ￿&t; (24)
where Q and Z are orthonormal matrices, i.e. QQT = ZZT = I, and S and
T are upper triangular.
18We present the techniques from the point of view of the model as we present it in the
main text of the paper. However, it is noteworthy that (22) could equally well capture a
forward-looking VAR (potentially only including present and past values). In this sense we
obtain an alternative identi￿cation technique for VARs that make the oxymoron Structural
VAR obsolete, albeit at a (usually small) e¢ ciency cost due to the necessity to move from
orinary least squares to instrumental variable techniques.
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that the ratios of the respective diagonal elements of S and T are increasing
in absolute value. Recycling notation, the resulting reordered equation
system can be written as
SZTYt = TZTYt￿1 + Q(￿ut + ￿&t): (25)







where ￿t denotes the subvector associated with unstable roots. I will de-















I can then impose the stability of the eco-
nomic system by setting ￿s = 0;8s:19 This amounts to imposing that
span(Q￿￿) ￿ span(Q￿￿) (27)
In order to allow for the case that the number of explosive roots generates






















These are the restrictions on the endogenous expectational errors given
by the stability condition. (27) is the condition that allows me to solve
the model. It is a necessary and su¢ cient condition. In order to obtain a
unique solution however I have to take a look at how the shock process en-




￿￿ T￿￿￿t￿1 + S
￿1
￿￿ Q￿(￿ut + ￿&t) (30)
19This is true as long as the growth rate of fusg is bounded by the smallest explosive root
of the process. This condition is trivially satis￿ed for a martingale shock process.
20See also Lubik and Schorfheide (2001).
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the present framework
The present example builds around the paradigm of the neoclassical synthesis
(Goodfried and King (1997)) and is a nutshell version of a class of models that
includes Jeanne (1997), Yun (1999), Kim (1998), Gali (2001) or Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) among many others.
The nutshell model excludes capital and involves three types of agents: a
continuum of consumers of measure unity, a continuum of producers of measure
unity, and a central bank determining policy.























































Ct denotes the basket of di⁄erentiated goods with constant elasticity of sub-
stitution ￿. Households choose not only the total level of consumption per
period, Ct, but also the composition fCt(z)gz￿[0;1] given prices fPt(z)gz￿[0;1] :
It is straightforward to show21 that given constant elasticity of substitution







The price index as the minimum expenditure that yields one unit of the




















21See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1996).
















(34) is the standard Euler equation for consumption, whereas (35) is the
intratemporal leisure-labor trade-o⁄ condition, and (36) gives money demand
as a function of the interest rate and marginal utility of consumption.
producers The production side is given by a continuum z￿[0;1] of produc-
ers that set prices in advance given demand functions (32) for their products. For
simplicity we suppose that their production technology is given by Yt(z) = Nt(z)




























and only a fraction 1￿’ of randomly-chosen ￿rms get to readjust in any given









The ￿rst-order necessary condition for ￿rms setting their prices in period t





















(41) shows how in the case of exogenously-imposed price-stickiness a la Calvo
today￿ s optimal price is a weighted average of the expected future marginal costs








Given some form of monetary policy to be discussed further below we then
obtain the general equilibrium for this economy by assuming that it is symmet-
ric, i.e.
Yt(z) = Yt8z (43)
22Since we assume away capital Ct(z) = Yt(z)8z￿[0;1]
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and imposing market clearing, i.e.
Ct = Yt (45)
and
Bt = 0 (46)
In log-linearized form I can then de￿ne the dynamics of the equilibrium
implicitly by the following system of equations, (47)-(50).




(it ￿ ￿t) + Etyt+1; (47)
where ￿t = pt+1 ￿ pt
￿ The forward-looking Phillips-curve23
￿t = ￿yt + ￿Et￿; (48)
where ￿ =
(1￿’)(1￿￿’)
’ (￿ + ￿n ￿ 1)
￿ The LM curve
mt ￿ pt = a1yt ￿ a2it; (49)
where a1 =
￿
"; a2 = 1
"i
￿ The log-linearized equation for wages
wt ￿ pt = byt; (50)
where b = (￿ + ￿n ￿ 1);
￿ and ￿nally, some yet to be speci￿ed monetary policy rule for the policy
control variable, here the nominal interest rate.
Given that (49) and (50) merely de￿ne demand for real balances and real
wages, respectively, let us drop them for they are inconsequential at this point.
The equilibrium dynamics will then be de￿ned by two equations, the IS
curve, (47), the Phillips curve, (48), and an exogenous process for policy, i.e.
the nominal interest rate it:


























23The Phillips curve is obtained by combining the log-linearized version of the ￿rst-order
condition for optimal pricing, (41), with the log-linearized version of the equation for wages,
(35).
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Xt = A1E[Xt+1] + A2Xt￿1 (52)
+A1PE[Pt+1] + A2PPt + A3PPt￿1 + But;





















; A2 = 02￿2; A1P = A3P = 02￿1; and structural economic
shocks ut that can be interpreted as shocks to the IS equation and the Phillips
Curve, respectively.
Clearly, in this simple DSGE model we can analyze the economic implica-
tions of arbitrary policy rules for the policy variable it. The matrices A1; A2;
A1P; A2P; A3P are una⁄ected by the particular policy rule under consideration,
for they are functions of the deep parameters of the economy, f￿;￿;￿g:
Estimation of the semi-structural form (52) would clearly be ine¢ cient in the
case that we know the model (in which case we could simply estimate f￿;￿;￿g
by e¢ cient maximum likelihood). On the other hand, estimation of (52) would
be robust to model uncertainty in the sense that if there is some unknown
stable DSGE model that generates the data, then the data-generating process
has an estimable representation of the form (52), and I can do empirical and
counterfactual policy analysis with the estimated model without having to write
down a model such as the present one that - in the spirit of the RBC school -
is known to be wrong to start with.
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The bond market is modeled with two key assumptions. I will introduce and
discuss them in turn.
Condition C1: Absence of Arbitrage (AoA)
According to Harrison and Kreps (1979) absence of arbitrage implies the
existence of a measure Q under which all discounted asset prices are martingales,
i.e.
EQ[e￿rtpi;t+1jFt] = pi;t; (53)
where rt denotes the risk-free rate (here the short rate), subindex i denotes
an asset in the asset span, and EQ denotes the expectation under the Martingale
equivalent measure Q given some ￿ltration Ft:24
Further, I can relate the expectation under the induced measure, denote







jFt] = EQ[pi;t+1jFt] (54)









pi;t = EP[mt+1pi;t+1jFt]; (56)
where mt is Ft￿measurable.
Note that this expectation is with respect to the induced measure P, the
density that can be estimated by maximum likelihood. I will make use of rela-
tionship (56) to estimate the pricing kernel, mt; form the sample observations
I have on the asset span across time. Here I will follow much of the literature
on empirical asset pricing (Constantinides, 1992, Ang and Piazessi, 2001) and
assume a particular functional form for the Radon-Nikodym derivative, which
in turn will allow me to retrieve the pricing kernel given its de￿nition in 56.











t ￿t ￿ ￿tut
￿
; (57)
24The martingale-equivalent measure Q could be dependent on the ￿ltration, i.e. if there
was heterogeneity in information sets each information set would have its associated measure.
If markets are incomplete the measure Q is not de￿ned uniquely, but I will here implicitly
assume that it is unique through time.
The measure Q that I will be looking for will also be have to be adapted to the information
set of the econometrician. All moments of the model, such as impulse-responses or variance
decompositions, will then be conditional on this ￿ltration and measure.
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￿t = ￿0 + ￿1Xt (58)
(58) says that the price of risk, ￿t, is an a¢ ne function in a vector of states
which includes the macroeconomic factors, Ft and the short rate, fft: Endowed
with a model for the short rate and a pricing kernel I can then use the chain
law that links the short rate to zero bonds and iteratively build up bond prices
for zero coupons for any maturity.
b1
t = EP[mt+1b0





I order to get an explicit solution for yields as a function of the state vector
I simply have to write on the iterative de￿nitions of bond prices as conditional
expectations implicit in (59-60). To do so I start by solving for the price of a











t ￿t ￿ ￿tutjFt
￿
and iterate from there on.
Finally, I can obtain the continuously compounded nominal yield is
t from









I have the yield curve.
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